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This paper explores how alternative assumptions about household portfolio behavior affect estimates
of the revenue cost of excluding state and local government interest payments from the federal income
tax base.  Standard tax expenditure estimates assume that current holders of tax-exempt bonds would
replace their holdings of tax-exempt bonds with taxable bonds if the tax exemption were eliminated.
 We consider a number of alternative possible portfolio responses.  Because taxable bonds are among
the most heavily taxed assets, assuming that investors holding tax-exempt bonds would otherwise
hold taxable bonds yields a larger estimate of the revenue cost of tax exemption than many alternative
assumptions.  Based on data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, we estimate that the revenue
cost of tax exemption under the "taxable bond substitution hypothesis" is $14.2 billion, compared
with $10.1 billion if corporate stock replaces tax-exempt bonds in household portfolios, and $7.9 billion
if investors distribute their tax-exempt bond holdings in proportion to the other assets currently in
their portfolios.  We also explore the revenue effects of capping the dollar amount of tax-exempt interest












  Exempting the interest paid by state and local governments from federal income taxation is 
one of the largest tax expenditures. The U.S. Treasury Department (2006) suggests that the tax 
expenditure on public-purpose tax-exempt bonds was $23.6 billion for FY2007.  The Joint 
Committee on Taxation’s (2006) estimate is $20.1 billion.  These estimates assume that if 
individual investors did not hold tax-exempt bonds, they would hold taxable bonds instead.  In all 
likelihood, more complex portfolio adjustments would follow changes in the tax treatment of 
interest payments on state and local government bonds.  Taxable bonds are among the most heavily 
taxed portfolio assets, so assuming that the high-marginal-tax rate household who own tax-exempt 
bonds would shift to holding highly-taxed taxable bonds if tax-exemption were repealed is likely to 
overstate the revenue cost of tax exemption.  If repeal of tax exemption leads current holders of tax-
exempt bonds to substitute into other lightly taxed assets, such as common stocks with low dividend 
yields, then the revenue gain from repeal could be much smaller than calculations based on the 
taxable bond substitution assumption suggest.  
  Several studies, most notably Galper and Toder (1981), Slemrod (1983), and Toder and 
Neubig (1985), have examined the tax exemption in general equilibrium models that endogenize 
household portfolio choices, the stock of state and local government capital, and the use of debt by 
states and localities.  These studies make the important point that “taxable bond substitution” is 
likely to misstate the revenue cost of tax exemption.  They also note that calibrating models of 
portfolio choice is difficult, because there are few empirical settings in which it is possible to 
identify how household portfolio decisions respond to tax policy. 
  This paper explores the revenue cost of exempting state and local interest payments from 
income taxation.  It focuses on revenue estimates, which unlike tax expenditure calculations, can 
consider a range of taxpayer responses to tax provisions.  Although we present new estimates of   2
how taxes affect portfolio structure, we conclude that existing empirical evidence admits a wide 
range of potential behavioral responses to the elimination of tax exemption.  Rather than using such 
estimates to calibrate a general equilibrium model to examine the revenue cost of tax exemption, we 
therefore explore how alternative assumptions about portfolio response affect estimates of the 
aggregate revenue cost of the interest exemption as well as the distribution of its benefits.   We limit 
our analysis to the household sector, although corporate ownership of tax-exempt bonds also has a 
substantial revenue cost.  For FY2007, the Joint Committee on Taxation (2006) estimates that the 
corporate income tax expenditure for tax-exempt bonds is roughly one third as large as the 
individual income tax expenditure.   
  The paper is divided into six sections.  The first summarizes the yield spread between 
taxable and tax-exempt bonds over the last two decades and the aggregate holdings of taxable and 
tax-exempt bonds by different classes of investors.  The second section describes the data sources 
that we use to analyze tax-exempt bond holdings and reports on the current cross-sectional 
distribution of tax-exempt bond holdings.  Section three briefly reviews the previous literature on 
how marginal income tax rates affect portfolio structure and then presents estimates of probit and 
tobit models for portfolio choice, emphasizing ownership of tax-exempt bonds, based on the 2004 
Survey of Consumer Finances.  The estimates of the link between a household’s marginal tax rate 
on interest income, and the share of tax-exempt bonds in the portfolio, admit a wide range of 
possible behavioral responses to tax changes.  The fourth section presents revenue estimates under 
the taxable bond substitution assumption as well as other assumptions about substitution patterns.  It 
demonstrates the substantial range that can result from alternative assumptions about portfolio 
response.  Section five considers the revenue and distributional effects of policies that would restrict   3
but not eliminate the income tax exclusion for state and local interest payments.  The final section 
concludes and suggests several directions for further research.   
1.  The Taxable-Tax Exempt Yield Spread and Aggregate Bond Holdings  
  The yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds has varied substantially over time, 
and in recent years has narrowed to levels that seem inconsistent with a simple interpretation of this 
yield spread as a reflection of the marginal tax rate at which an investor would be indifferent 
between investing in a taxable and a tax-exempt bond.  Simple yield comparisons are valid only 
when the risk attributes of the taxable and tax-exempt bonds are similar.  When the yield spread is 
narrow, some argue that the federal government is losing revenue while the state and local 
borrowers are not much better off than they would be without income tax exclusion of their interest 
payments.  An alternative explanation of narrow yields is that they reflect periods when the 
perceived risk of tax-exempt bonds is particularly high. 
1.1 The Yield Spread, 1990-2008  
  Table 1 shows annual average yields on AAA municipal, U.S. Treasury, and AAA corporate 
bonds with a ten-year maturity. These averages are based on daily yields provided by Bloomberg, 
which reports information on prices and yields for various tax-exempt and taxable securities.   The 
data suggest two conclusions.  First, the average yield differential between Treasury bonds and tax-
exempt bonds corresponds to an “implicit tax rate” well below the top statutory marginal tax rate in 
the federal income tax code.  The implicit tax rate θ is the value that satisfies (1-θ)RT = RM, where 
RT denotes a taxable interest rate and RM denotes the interest rate on a tax-exempt bond.  For 2007 
this implicit tax rate averaged less than 24 percent, and for 2003 and 2005 it fell below 20 percent.  
For the first nine months of 2008, the implicit tax rate averaged only 10.7 percent.  At the beginning 
of the 1990s, by comparison, the implicit tax rate was greater than 30 percent.     4
  Second, the implicit tax rate computed by comparing corporate and municipal bond yields 
with similar ratings is higher than that computed by comparing Treasury bonds with municipals, 
and it has not fallen nearly as far as the Treasury-based implicit tax rate during the last twenty 
years.  For 2007, the implicit tax rate based on corporate yields averaged 41.2 percent, suggesting 
that some of the narrowing of the Treasury-municipal bond yield spread is due to developments in 
the Treasury market rather than in the tax-exempt bond market.  
  The recent data in Table 1 are among the most striking.  The implicit tax rate of 10.7 percent 
between Treasury bonds and tax-exempt bonds in the first nine months of 2008 is extraordinary by 
historical standards.  During this period even the implicit tax rate with corporate bonds, 29.8 
percent, fell well below its historic average.  This reflects the impact of the financial turmoil of 
2008.  Yields on tax-exempt securities, particularly so-called “auction rate municipals” with short 
maturities, rose sharply and in many cases exceeded the yields on taxable securities with 
comparable maturities.  Figure 1 shows the yield spreads for different maturities and credit ratings, 
including the period when the yield spread became negative and municipal bond yields exceeded 
the yields on Treasury bonds.  The low yields on Treasury securities during this period were 
apparently driven in part by a flight to quality during particularly unstable times in the financial 
markets.   
  The entries in Table 1 show that the implicit tax rate fluctuates substantially over time.    
Various studies have developed frameworks for analyzing these differences.  Green (1993) 
emphasizes the need to recognize that bonds may not be held to maturity, and demonstrates that this 
can affect the interpretation of the yield spread.  Poterba (1986) argues that changes in the yield 
spread may be linked to changing expectations of future tax policy, although it is not clear that tax 
events can explain the narrowing of yield spreads in 2008.  Changing risk factors are another   5
potential source of time series variation in yield spreads.  Chalmers (2006), however, shows that 
risk considerations seem unable to explain the level of the taxable-tax exempt yield spread.   
  The data in Table 1 correspond to bonds that generate fully tax-exempt interest.  Some 
private-purpose bonds issued by state and local governments generate interest that is exempt from 
the federal income tax but that is subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).  Table 2 shows 
yield spreads at the one-, ten-, and thirty-year maturity for both fully tax-exempt and AMT-taxable 
bonds in 2003. We use daily yields for AMT-free tax-exempt bonds, AMT-subject private taxable 
bonds, and Treasury bonds to construct the entries.  The implicit tax rate on AMT bonds is about 
twenty percentage points lower than that on fully tax-exempt bonds at the one-year maturity, ten 
percentage points lower at the 10-year maturity, and five percentage points lower at the 30-year 
maturity.  These changes across maturities may reflect declining market beliefs about the 
probability of the AMT being in force in future years.  The implicit tax rate differential between 
fully tax-exempt and AMT-taxable bonds at the short maturity, between 19 and 26 percentage 
points depending on the specific comparison, is close to the AMT tax rate.   The yields on Treasury 
bonds with maturities of one year, and of thirty years, were below the yields of tax-exempt bonds 
that paid interest subject to the AMT. 
1.2 Aggregate Holdings of Tax-Exempt and Taxable Bonds  
  The revenue cost of excluding interest paid by state and local governments from the federal 
income tax depends on who owns state and local government bonds and what those investors would 
do in the absence of tax exemption.  Table 3 displays data on the ownership of both taxable and tax-
exempt bonds in 2003.  Households owned 36 percent of the outstanding debt of state and local 
governments directly.  Another 29 percent was held by mutual funds, which are in turn owned 
primarily by households.  In contrast, one quarter of outstanding U.S. Treasury bonds were held   6
abroad.  Fourteen percent were held directly by households and another ten percent are held by 
mutual funds.  In the Flow of Funds, the “household” sector includes untaxed nonprofit institutions 
as well as taxable households.  Nonprofit institutions are much more likely to hold taxable bonds 
than are taxable households.  The data in Table 3 are relevant for analyzing the change in portfolio 
structure that might follow the elimination of tax exemption, since if currently tax-exempt bonds 
became taxable, the ownership profile for these bonds might ultimately resemble that for currently 
taxable bonds rather than currently tax-exempt bonds. 
2.  Household Data: The 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances and TAXSIM 
  We rely on household-level data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances to evaluate 
the potential revenue consequences of changing the tax exemption.  We impute marginal tax rates to 
SCF households using the code provided by Moore (2004) to construct the twenty-two variables 
needed to run the NBER’s Internet TAXSIM program, run the TAXSIM program, and then append 
the marginal tax rates to each household record.  Feenberg and Coutts (1993) describe the basic 
structure of the TAXSIM program, which can be used to produce both first-dollar and last-dollar 
marginal tax rates on taxable interest income and other components of adjusted gross income.  The 
difference between these tax rates arises from differences in the income components that 
households are assigned before the marginal tax rate calculation.  The first dollar tax rate measures 
the tax rate on interest income, for example, if the household had no other interest income; the last 
dollar rate reflects the tax rate on the actual last dollar of such income, and consequently is affected 
by the household’s portfolio holdings and income composition.  The link between portfolio 
structure and the last-dollar tax rate makes this tax measure an endogenous variable in econometric 
models of household portfolio selection.     7
2.1 Aggregate Consistency Checks for SCF Data 
  The SCF is the most detailed and reliable source of data on household finances.  We 
nevertheless performed some external validation tests for the data on tax-exempt bond holdings.  In 
2004, the SCF interviewed 4,519 households.  The public use SCF data file includes 22,595 
observations, which corresponds to five “replicates” for each underlying SCF observation.  Because 
the SCF file includes imputed values for some data items that are missing in the household’s actual 
responses, the replicates associated with a given underlying observation may have different values 
of some variables.  Different observations have different sample weights, and the weighted sum of 
SCF households corresponds to 112 million U.S. households.  Total financial assets of these 
households, defined following Poterba and Samwick (2002) as the sum of directly held equity, 
equity in mutual funds, tax deferred equity, tax deferred bonds, tax-exempt bonds, taxable bonds, 
interest bearing accounts and other financial assets, is $17.4 trillion.  The tax-exempt bonds 
category includes tax-exempt bonds held through mutual funds that are identified as tax-exempt 
bond funds.  Taxable bonds include government bonds, corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and 
mortgage bonds, once again including both direct holdings and holdings through mutual funds.  
Interest bearing accounts include checking and savings accounts, plus certificates of deposits.  
Other financial assets include annuities, trust funds, hedge funds with equity interest, and life 
insurance premiums. 
  The 2004 SCF reports aggregate direct household ownership of tax-exempt bonds of $756 
billion.  By comparison, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2007) Flow of Funds Accounts 
Table L.211 shows $704 billion of direct household-owned tax-exempt bonds.  The “household 
sector” for this purpose includes nonprofit institutions, but since they are tax-exempt, they are 
unlikely to hold substantial amounts of tax-favored state and local debt.  In addition, the Flow of   8
Funds show holdings of tax exempt bonds by mutual funds, money market mutual funds, and 
closed-end funds of $290 billion, $292 billion, and $89 billion, respectively, at year-end 2003.  The 
household sector owned 62.3 percent of mutual fund shares and 48 percent of money market mutual 
fund shares.  The SCF reports tax-exempt bonds in mutual funds, but it does not distinguish 
between money market mutual funds and regular mutual funds.  The SCF total for these holdings is 
$300 billion, compared with $376 based on the ownership shares and aggregate values of the 
various funds from the Flow of Funds accounts.  While these summary statistics suggest some 
differences between the Flow of Funds aggregates and the SCF, they also suggest that the SCF asset 
stocks are reasonably close to other information on the aggregates.   
  Shifting from stocks to flows, the amount of tax-exempt interest that SCF households 
reported for 2003, $57.5 billion, can be compared with information reported on tax returns.  The 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service (2005) indicates that in 2003, households reported $53.7 billion of 
tax-exempt interest on their Forms 1040.  This suggests reasonably close agreement between the 
survey and tax return information. 
2.2 Consistency of Stocks and Flows in SCF  
  One potential difficulty with the SCF data is the imperfect matching between asset income 
and asset holdings.  Table 4 illustrates the problem.  Nearly three percent of SCF observations, 
corresponding to slightly less than two percent of the population, report holding tax-exempt bonds 
but receiving no tax-exempt interest.  In addition, just over three percent of the observations, 
representing slightly more than one percent of the population, report tax-exempt interest but no 
holdings of tax-exempt bonds.  
  The mismatch problem can be further illustrated by calculating the distribution of the ratio 
of tax-exempt interest payments to tax-exempt bond holdings.  Table 5 presents summary   9
information on this “implied interest rate.” The median, computed for all households with tax-
exempt bond holdings, is 4.9 percent.  The interquartile range spans 3.2 to 12.7 percent. When 
implied interest rates for each household are weighted by the household’s ownership of tax-exempt 
bonds, we find a median yield on tax-exempt bond holdings of 3.7 percent.  The interquartile range 
when weighted is 2.0 to 5.4 percent.   There are some extreme outliers in the data set.  Nearly five 
percent of households reporting tax-exempt interest rates of less than one percent, and interest rates 
of more than ten percent reported by at least ten percent of the households with tax-exempt debt.   
  One potential explanation for the inconsistencies is that while households were interviewed 
in 2004, the questionnaire specifically asks about tax information for fiscal year 2003. The 
households with stock-flow inconsistencies might have bought or sold tax-exempt securities 
between 2003 and 2004. It is also possible that the differences are due to misreporting in either 
flows of income or stocks of assets – measurement error or failures of some households to 
understand their detailed financial affairs.  Finally, it is possible that the errors arise because of the 
imputation algorithm used to construct the various SCF replicates.  It imputes information on 
interest income separately from information on tax-exempt bond holdings, so it may generate 
outlying ratios of the two.  The source of such stock-flow inconsistencies is a subject of ongoing 
SCF research.  Some view the SCF’s balance sheet data as more reliable than income flow 
variables.  However, since computing marginal tax rates requires data on income flows from many 
different sources, such as dividends, taxable interest, and capital gains, we do not disregard SCF 
flow data but instead use both stock and flow data in our analysis.    
2.3 Holdings of Tax-Exempt Debt by Marginal Tax Rate  
  Table 6 presents information on the percentage of tax-exempt debt that is held by 
households in various marginal tax rate categories for 2003.  The table shows that 53 percent of tax-  10
exempt bonds are held by households with marginal tax rates in excess of 30 percent, and that 49 
percent of tax-exempt interest is reported by households in these tax brackets.  As in Feenberg and 
Poterba (1991), households with very low marginal tax rates hold close to ten percent of tax-exempt 
debt.  For these households, holding tax-exempt debt would appear to be a tax-inefficient decision, 
although it is possible that data errors or specialized financial circumstances explain these 
outcomes.  It is possible that our algorithm has assigned these households incorrectly low marginal 
tax rates, either because the SCF has omitted or understated some components of income, or 
because we have over-stated deductions.  It is also possible that the tax rates for these households 
may be lower than their long-run average.  We cannot evaluate transitory movements in marginal 
tax rates using our data, which is confined to a single cross-section.      
3.  Tax Rates and Household Portfolio Structure 
The data on tax-exempt bond holdings by household marginal tax rate suggest that tax 
clienteles form to at least some degree.  The central empirical issue for analyzing the revenue 
impact of changes in the tax exemption for state and local interest payments is how households with 
current holdings of tax-exempt bonds would modify their portfolios in the absence of tax 
exemption.  The studies that most directly address this issue are Galper and Toder (1981), Slemrod 
(1983), and Toder and Neubig (1985).  All of these studies rely on general equilibrium models of 
household portfolio choice to model how changes in the institutional setting for state and local 
bonds, such as repeal of tax exemption or expansion of the set of borrowers who are granted tax 
exemption, would affect portfolio holdings and yield spreads.  These studies note that there is 
remarkably little empirical evidence on the way household portfolios might evolve following a 
change in the tax exemption.  In the more than two decades since these studies were published, 
there have been several studies of taxes and portfolio behavior, including Scholz (1994), Bakija   11
(2000), and Poterba and Samwick (2003), but they do not deliver clear guidance on how portfolios 
would adjust if tax exemption were eliminated.  Each of these studies estimates the relationship 
between household marginal tax rates and portfolio structure.  The results, however, typically offer 
relatively wide bands of potential household response.   
  The wide range of empirical findings on portfolio behavior is not surprising, and may arise 
from two challenges in modeling portfolio choices. One is conceptual: studies such as Auerbach 
and King (1983) suggest that clientele equilibria are a realistic possibility, even though factors 
beside taxes such as demand for diversification play an important role in portfolio choice.  Because 
clientele equilibria involve households choosing to locate at corner solutions, they do not generate 
the smooth changes in individual behavior as a function of tax rates – the type of behavior that we 
typically model in household-level empirical work.   
The other challenge arises from the complexity of the economic environment in which 
portfolio decisions are made.  The effect of taxes on the demand for one asset is likely to depend on 
the menu of other assets available, on the tax treatment of the other assets, and on the availability of 
short-selling opportunities in some asset classes. It can be difficult to fully characterize all of these 
constraints in household-level data sets, particularly because different households may have access 
to different financial opportunities.  In spite of these difficulties, each of the three studies mentioned 
above suggest that households with higher marginal tax rates on taxable bonds are more likely to 
invest in tax-exempt bonds than their less-heavily-taxed counterparts.  
To provide new empirical evidence on how taxes affect portfolio structure, we follow 
Poterba and Samwick (2003) by estimating probit and tobit models for household portfolio 
holdings.  We focus on tax-exempt bond holdings, with household income, net worth, marginal tax 
rate, and demographic variables as explanatory variables.  We estimate models using the 2004   12
Survey of Consumer Finances data that we use throughout this study.  Unlike the 1998 SCF data set 
that was used in that earlier study, the 2004 SCF does not include location identifiers so it is not 
possible to impute even an imprecise measure of state marginal income tax rates.  We also use 
TAXSIM and Moore’s (2003) interface between SCF data records and TAXSIM to compute 
marginal tax rates; Poterba and Samwick (2003) used a tax rate calculator written specifically for 
the 1998 SCF.  They also computed a variant of a first-dollar marginal tax rate as their key 
explanatory variable, by calculated a measure of the increase in the household’s tax burden 
associated with a hypothetical increment to their capital income, relative to that income increment.  
To assess how the differences in this component of our methodology may affect our findings, we 
also present estimates using our tax rate calculation and the 1998 SCF data.    
The baseline specification for the latent variable (S*i) that determines household i’s notional 
portfolio share in tax exempt bonds is  
 S*i = Xiβ+ εi  .            ( 1 )    
The set of explanatory variables, Xi, includes six categorical variables for the household’s income 
excluding income from portfolio assets.  This income measure is defined as the sum of wages, 
business income, rent, unemployment insurance, alimony, and Social Security and pension income.  
The specification also includes five categorical variables for household net worth, four indicators 
for educational attainment, and several variables that proxy for household risk tolerance.  The 
explanatory variable of primary interest is the household’s last-dollar marginal tax rate on interest 
income.  Because last-dollar tax rates are potentially endogenous, we follow an instrumental 
variable estimation strategy that relies on first-dollar marginal tax rates or state-level marginal tax 
rates as instruments.  The latter strategy is only possible in the 1998 data, which has some 
information on geographic location.     13
  Table 7 presents our estimates.  The table is divided into two panels, each of which presents 
four specifications.  The left-hand panel shows probit models for the ownership of tax-exempt debt, 
while the right-hand panel reports tobit models for the share of tax-exempt debt in the household’s 
portfolio.  The first specification in each panel uses the 2004 SCF data, with a last-dollar marginal 
tax rate variable based only on federal taxes, and the first-dollar federal marginal tax rate used as 
the instrumental variable.  The second specification uses the 1998 SCF data, with a last-dollar 
marginal tax rate based on both federal and an estimate of state income taxes, instrumented in this 
case using the first-dollar state and federal marginal tax rate.  The third specification uses the 
estimate of state marginal tax rate as the instrumental variable for the combined federal and state 
last-dollar marginal tax rate.  This specification again uses 1998 data.  Finally, the last specification, 
also for 1998, uses two instruments: the state marginal tax rate and the first-dollar federal marginal 
tax rate.   
The results suggest substantial variation in the marginal tax rate coefficient across 
specifications, and relatively imprecise estimates in all cases.  The 2004 data, in the first columns, 
yields a negative point estimate for the marginal tax rate effect, but the standard error is roughly the 
same size as the coefficient.  The 1998 data yield positive coefficients on the marginal tax rate in all 
cases, suggesting that a higher marginal tax rate is associated with higher tax-exempt bond 
holdings, but the standard errors are again large.  The findings differ from those in Poterba and 
Samwick (2003), who found positive and statistically significant effects of marginal tax rates on 
tax-exempt bond holdings using something similar to a first-dollar marginal tax rate.  When we 
replaced our last-dollar marginal tax rates in the specifications in Table 7 with first-dollar rates, and 
re-estimated without instrumental variables, our coefficients for the 1998 SCF were negative but 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  This suggests that the difference between our findings and   14
those in Poterba and Samwick (2003) may arise from differences in the marginal tax rate 
calculation or other aspects of the estimation sample.  The disparities suggest that whatever links 
between marginal tax rates and holdings of tax-exempt bonds may emerge in these data, they are 
not particularly robust.  
The right-hand panel of Table 7 reports tobit models for the portfolio share devoted to tax-
exempt bonds.  The tobit coefficients display the same pattern as the probit coefficients, and once 
again fail to differ from zero at standard levels of statistical significance. The large standard errors 
associated with our estimates of how tax rates on interest income affect holdings of tax-exempt 
bonds make us reluctant to use these estimates as a basis for evaluating how portfolios might shift 
in response to the end of tax exemption.  Instead, we devote the balance of this paper to considering 
a range of possible revenue effects under different assumptions about portfolio adjustment.  
4.  Revenue Cost of Tax Exemption 
  This section computes a baseline estimate of the revenue cost of the individual income tax 
exemption for state and local interest payments assuming that neither investors nor tax-exempt 
borrowers change their behaviors in response to the repeal of tax exemption, and then explores 
several alternative calculations. 
4.1 Baseline Estimates: Taxable Bond Substitution 
  Our baseline analysis, which corresponds to the standard tax expenditure calculation, 
assumes that households who hold tax-exempt bonds replace their holdings with taxable bonds, an 
assumption that is consistent with tax-exempt borrowers continuing to borrow whatever they did 
when their interest was tax-exempt, although now with taxable debt, and with the same investors 
who held tax-exempt bonds holding these newly-taxable bonds.  Moreover, this calculation assumes 
that the interest rate on these now-taxable bonds is the same as the current taxable interest rates to   15
which we have compared tax-exempt bond yields.  If the current comparison is not capturing like-
risk bonds, then the actual interest rate if tax-exempt bonds became taxable might differ from the 
rate that we assume. 
  We compute the revenue cost by multiplying each household’s reported tax-exempt interest, 
Rj,2003, by 1.2182, the ratio of the taxable and the tax-exempt interest rate in 2003, and by the 
TAXSIM estimate of the household’s federal marginal income tax rate on interest income (τj,2003).  
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(2) 
In this expression, i denotes the average interest rate in 2003 on either taxable and tax-exempt 
securities; w is the SCF weight; the subscript j corresponds to households.  This calculation yields 
an estimated revenue cost of $19.5 billion for 2003.   
  A parallel estimate could be developed using data from the Statistics of Income Public Use 
File, by calculating a marginal tax rate on interest income for each tax filer using TAXSIM and then 
applying the interest rate gross-up factor described above.  A key feature of this calculation is the 
assumption that a constant marginal tax rate applies to all of the interest income received by the 
household.  In practice, the progressive nature of the tax code implies that the last dollar of interest 
income may face a higher tax rate than the first dollar – so the foregoing calculation may overstate 
the revenue yield from taxing state and local interest payments.    
  We also estimate the revenue cost of the tax exemption using SCF balance sheet data on 
holdings of tax-exempt bonds rather than reported tax-exempt interest income.  In this case, we 
multiply the tax-exempt bond holdings of each investor (Bj,2004) by the average 2004 return on 
taxable bonds (4.495%), which we calculate as the equal-weighted average of 4.24%, the yield on   16
Treasury bonds, and 4.75%, the yield on AAA corporate bonds.  We then multiply the resulting 
product by the household’s marginal income tax rate on taxable interest income.    
  ( ) ∑ × × = Δ
j
j j j i B w Revenue 2003 2004 , 2003 , 2004 τ ,  (3) 
This approach generates an estimated 2004 revenue cost of $12.7 billion for the interest exemption.    
  The difference in the estimated revenue costs using the flow-based and stock-based 
approaches could arise from an error in the assumed interest rate on taxable bonds in (3), or from an 
error in the gross up factor in (2).  Our analysis uses the yields on AAA bonds, but if investors hold 
lower quality bonds, the yield spread and the corresponding gross-up factor may be smaller and the 
$19.5 billion estimate may be too high.  If we assume, very conservatively, that taxable state and 
local bonds would yield the same interest rate that these bonds paid when tax-exempt, the revenue 
estimate is $16.0 billion.  The stock-flow difference could also arise from the mismatch between 
stocks and flows noted above.  If stocks are measured better than flows, then the balance-sheet 
based approach may provide better revenue estimates, and vice versa. 
4.2 Alternative Portfolio Adjustments 
  The average marginal interest income tax rate of tax-exempt bond holders is 26.8 percent, 
weighted by bond holdings.  Assuming that these investors would replace tax-exempt bonds in their 
portfolios with taxable bonds therefore generates substantial revenue – but this assumption is open 
to question, since existing portfolio patterns suggest that highly-taxed investors tilt their portfolios 
toward lightly-taxed assets.    
  Table 8 describes the aggregate portfolio shares of various assets in the portfolio of all SCF 
respondents with and without positive holdings of tax-exempt bonds.  For the latter group, taxable 
bonds account for four percent of their portfolio while interest-bearing accounts represent 24 
percent.  For those with tax-exempt bonds, taxable bonds represent six percent, and interest bearing   17
accounts nine percent, of the total.  Tax-exempt bonds, in contrast, represent 18 percent of the 
portfolio for these households.  Taxable interest-bearing assets are a smaller share of the portfolios 
of households with tax-exempt bonds than of households without such bonds.  Equity, held directly 
or through mutual funds, accounts for 44 percent of the portfolio of those who hold tax-exempt 
bonds and 35 percent of those who do not.  If the households who currently hold tax-exempt bonds 
were to sell these bonds and allocate the proceeds in proportion to their holdings of all other assets 
in their portfolios, only 18.2 percent (=15/(1-.18)) of the current holdings of tax-exempt bonds 
would be replaced by taxable bonds – much less than the foregoing revenue calculations assumed.  
Other more lightly taxed assets, such as equities, and assets that generate low rates of return, such as 
holdings in transaction accounts, would account for the remainder of the portfolio.  The tax increase 
for current holders of tax-exempt bonds would be smaller in this case than if they substituted toward 
taxable bonds.   
  Table 9 presents information on the degree of clientele specialization in portfolio structure.  
Direct asset holdings are combined with holdings through mutual funds.  Sixty-nine million of the 
112 million SCF households hold no stocks in taxable accounts, no taxable bonds, and no tax-
exempt bonds either directly or in mutual funds.  Some of these households (4.5 million) hold 
stocks or bonds through tax-deferred accounts such as IRAs and 401(k)s, but such holdings do not 
bear on tax-induced portfolio specialization.  Just over ten million households have only taxable 
interest-bearing assets, almost 19 million have only corporate equity, and 0.24 million have only 
tax-exempt bonds. Those who specialize in equities hold 31 percent of all financial assets, while 
those who have both equities and taxable bonds represent 20 percent of the total.   
  To illustrate how various degrees of portfolio adjustment affect estimates of the revenue cost 
of tax exemption, we consider four potential portfolio adjustment strategies.  These are (i) taxable   18
bond substitution; (ii) “proportional substitution,” which assumes that investors replace tax-exempt 
bonds with all other assets in the same proportion as they were found in their original taxable 
portfolio; (iii) “equity substitution,” which assumes that investors substitute tax-exempt bonds with 
direct equity holdings; and (iv) “tax efficient substitution,” which assumes that investors substitute 
direct equity holdings for tax-exempt bonds if their marginal tax rate on other income is lower than 
20 percent and with taxable bonds otherwise.  In each case, we assume that the taxable households 
who are changing their portfolios are trading with tax-exempt institutions: foundations, 
endowments, or foreign investors who are not subject to U.S. income taxes.  In the absence of such 
an assumption, our calculations would need to recognize the revenue consequences of portfolio 
adjustment for the other investors whose portfolios also change as households rebalance their 
holdings.  Our substitution assumptions rule out any transfers of assets between tax-deferred 
retirement accounts, such as 401(k)s and IRAs, and taxable portfolios, on the grounds that many 
households view these as distinct sub-portfolios.  We regard the “proportional” and “equity 
substitution” cases as invoking simple rules of thumb for portfolio change that may provide some 
indication of how households might respond to a change in tax rules. 
  Table 10 shows how household portfolios would change if investors responded in each of 
these ways to elimination of tax exemption.  We compute the taxable income for each household in 
the SCF under each of the alternative portfolio substitution scenarios.  We assume an interest rate of 
3.69 percent on tax-exempt bonds -- the average of daily yields on AAA municipal bond indices 
with 10 year maturities for 2003.  For taxable bonds we assume an interest rate of 4.495 percent, the 
simple average of the mean of daily yields on Treasury bonds (4.24) and AAA Corporate bonds 
(4.75) in 2003, both for 10 year maturities.  We assume an average return on interest bearing 
accounts equal to one-quarter of the interest rate on taxable bonds: 1.124 percent.  Equities are   19
assumed to generate realized capital gains equal to 2.75 percent of their market value.  This value, 
which is one-quarter of the historical total return on large-cap stocks that Morningstar (2007) 
reports for the period 1926-2006, minus the corresponding dividend yield of 2.0 percent, reflects 
underlying assumptions both about the appreciation rate for stocks and the gain realization rate.  We 
assume that only one quarter of unrealized capital gains are taxed in a given year.  For equity held 
through mutual funds we assume that half of accruing gains are realized, which translates into a 
correspondingly higher tax burden on capital gains.  We assume the same dividend yield for 
directly-held equity and for stocks held through mutual funds. 
  We compute the revenue consequences of eliminating the interest tax exemption under each 
of these alternative behavioral assumptions in several steps.  First, we construct each household’s 
portfolio under the corresponding assumption about portfolio adjustment.  Then, we impute the 
capital income flows that would be associated with this portfolio, under the rate of return 
assumptions described above.  Finally, we compute the household’s federal tax liabilities in this 
setting by using TAXSIM to compute the income tax liability of a taxpayer with the household’s 
modified income components.  Finally, we estimate the revenue cost of the tax-exemption as:  





k FTL FTL w Revenue
*
2003 , 2003 , 2003 ,   (4) 
where, FTL: are the Federal Tax Liabilities of investor j obtained through TAXSIM when portfolio 
substitution pattern k is assumed, FTL*: are the Federal Tax Liabilities of investor j obtained 
through TAXSIM using original data from the SCF for fiscal year 2003.  The sum over j with 
weight wj  indicates a weighted sum over all SCF households using the sampling weights. 
Comparing federal tax liabilities with and without tax exempt debt in the portfolio, subject to our 
portfolio adjustment rules, yields estimates of the revenue cost that recognize that the marginal tax 
rate applicable to the household’s portfolio income is not constant.     20
  Table 11 presents our revenue estimates under different portfolio adjustment scenarios.  The 
highest revenue effect of repealing tax exemption corresponds to the taxable bonds adjustment 
($14.20 billion), since tax exempt bonds are replaced with the most heavily taxed asset in taxable 
portfolios.   When we assume that households replace tax-exempt debt with equity, or that they 
choose between equity and other assets in a tax-efficient way, we find smaller estimates of the 
revenue cost of the tax expenditure: $10.1 billion and $10.9 billion, respectively.  The proportional 
substitution case produces the lowest estimate of the tax cost ($7.9 billion), in part because some 
tax-exempt bonds are replaced with low-interest assets such as balances in transaction accounts.  
Since investors who hold tax-exempt bonds are unlikely to use them for liquidity purposes, this 
does not seem like a very plausible substitution pattern.    
  While we focus on revenue estimates rather than tax expenditures, we should note that each 
of the alternative adjustment strategies we consider would result in changes to the tax expenditure 
budget because they would affect household ownership of securities that generate dividends and 
capital gains, both of which are currently the subject of distinct tax expenditures.  The tax 
expenditure for capital gains would increase, for example, in our equity substitution case.  This 
underscores the limited nature of the calculations we present: we are not describing the net effect of 
eliminating tax exemption on the tax expenditure budget, but rather the revenue effect of one aspect 
of behavioral change. 
4.3  Distributional Effects of Repealing Tax Exemption  
  The last five columns of Table 11 present information on the distributional burden of 
eliminating the tax exemption.  Each column reports the share of the revenue increase that 
corresponds to households in a particular income range: below $40K, $40-75K, $75-125K, $125-
250K and $250K+. Because the ownership of tax-exempt bonds is highly skewed, the highest   21
income group bears roughly eighty percent of the tax increase when the tax exemption is repealed.  
Households with incomes below $40,000, in contrast, bear less than one percent of the burden. 
  Table 12 reports the weighted mean change in federal tax liabilities due to the repeal of the 
tax exemption.  For households with incomes below $40,000 but some holdings of tax-exempt 
bonds, the mean and median changes are close to zero.  For those with incomes above $250,000, the 
average tax increase exceeds $10,000, while the median tax increase is around $2,200. 
5.  Alternatives to the Elimination of Tax Exemption 
 
  While elimination is the most frequently proposed change to the current tax exemption for 
state and local interest payments, there are also other proposals that are sometimes discussed by tax-
writing committees.  One involves limiting the amount of exempt interest to a fixed fraction of AGI, 
and the other involves capping the amount of exempt interest per tax return.  Tables 13 and 14 
report the distribution of tax-exempt interest as a share of AGI, and the distribution of the total 
amount of tax-exempt interest, respectively.  Table 13 shows that without any behavioral changes, 
limiting exempt interest to ten percent of AGI would affect households who hold approximately 
sixty percent tax-exempt bonds.  Limiting tax-exempt interest to thirty percent of AGI would affect 
households owning 37 percent of tax-exempt bonds.  Table 14 shows that limiting the amount of 
tax-exempt interest to $10,000 per tax return would affect households that own 78 percent of tax-
exempt bonds, while increasing this limit to $100,000 would reduce the impact to households that 
own 39 percent of tax-exempt bonds. 
  To compute the revenue effects of various limits on tax-exempt interest, we use the 
procedure outlined in conjunction with equation (4), along with our four portfolio adjustment 
assumptions.  For a given exempt interest threshold, if a household’s exempt interest in 2004 would 
place half of this interest above the limit, then we assume that this investor would adjust half of her   22
tax-exempt bond holdings in accordance with the assumed adjustment strategy.  Table 15 reports 
our estimates of the revenue effects of various limits on tax-exempt interest.  We estimate that 
limiting tax-exempt interest to $100,000 per tax return would raise $3.9 billion if households 
substitute taxable bonds for tax-exempt bonds, and $2.7 billion if they substitute with equity.  For a 
$50,000 limit, the corresponding values are $6.2 and $4.3 billion.  Limiting tax-exempt interest to 
30 percent of AGI would raise $1.4 billion in the taxable bond substitution case, and $0.9 billion in 
the equity substitution case. 
6.  Conclusion  
  This paper suggests that the revenue cost of exempting state and local government interest 
payments from the federal income tax may be smaller than standard tax expenditure estimates 
indicate. If high-tax-bracket individual investors react to restrictions on or elimination of tax 
exemption by selling their previously tax-exempt bonds and shifting their portfolios toward lightly-
taxed assets such as low-yield corporate equities, the revenue gain from curtailing the exemption is 
likely to be substantially smaller than standard analyses suggest.  The standard assumption is that 
households will continue to hold their tax-exempt bonds, even when their interest becomes taxable 
and their yields rise accordingly.  Under plausible assumptions about the degree of portfolio 
substitution, the revenue cost might be as little as half the standard estimate.  These results echo 
other recent studies of portfolio adjustment in response to tax deductions, such as Gervais and 
Pandey’s (2008) analysis of the home mortgage interest deduction. 
  Our analysis has relied on illustrative examples of portfolio adjustment strategies, rather 
than a model of portfolio adjustment estimated on household data, because the estimates of such 
models do not appear precise enough for use in detailed revenue estimation.   Better estimates of 
these responses are an important future need.  Such research might begin by comparing the findings   23
of previous studies and seeking to explain the sensitivity of those results to alternative measures of 
the household tax rate.  A second critical need is for estimates of the potential behavioral response 
by state and local governments if tax exemption were eliminated or restricted.  Our revenue 
estimates assume that the stock of tax-exempt bonds does not change when the income tax rules 
governing tax exemption are modified.  This is unlikely; Gordon and Slemrod (1983, 1985) and 
Gordon and Metcalf (1991), among others, emphasize that some shift toward tax finance would be 
likely if tax exemption were eliminated.  Their analysis focuses on the choice between borrowing 
through a state or local government, or borrowing on personal account and financing public 
spending with taxes.  The choice between borrowing options is affected by the tax-exemption rules 
as well as other parameters of the tax code.  Recognizing the potential changes in borrowing by 
states and localities could affect the equilibrium interest rate on their bonds, as well as the other 
deductions claimed by households who pay property taxes and state income taxes.   
We have stopped short of exploring many interesting issues related to the current tax 
exemption.  For example, we do not consider whether the tax exclusion for interest payments by 
state and local governments is a cost-effective policy for supporting these governments.  Addressing 
this issue requires resolving the extent to which the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt 
bonds is attributable to risk differentials, and the extent to which it is due to the fiscal subsidy.  
Several decades of active research notwithstanding, this is still an open issue on which progress is 
likely to require insights from both public finance and financial economics.  We have also avoided 
any analysis of the holdings of tax-exempt bonds by corporations, and their potential response to a 
change in tax rules.  Because corporate holders of tax-exempt bonds may be engaged in a range of 
complex financing transactions, described for example in Erikson, Goolsbee and Maydew (2003),   24
tracking the range of potential responses to a tax change may be even more difficult for this group 
than for households.   25
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Figure 1:  Yield Spreads (in Basis Points) Between Tax-Exempt and Treasury Bonds in First Six 
Months of 2008, Various Maturities and Credit Ratings   29
 
Table 1: Implicit Tax Rates on Prime-Grade Municipal Bonds Relative to Taxable 
Treasury and Corporate Bonds, 1991-2007 
  Yields   Spreads   Implicit tax rates  




Muni Treasuries  Corporates 
1991 6.02%  8.17%  8.39%  2.14%  2.4%  35.59% 39.2% 
1992 5.58  7.25 7.43  1.68 1.8 30.03  33.2 
1993 4.74  6.19 6.32  1.45 1.6 30.62  33.2 
1994 5.28  7.21 7.49  1.93 2.2 36.47  41.8 
1995 5.04  6.71 6.97  1.67 1.9 33.01  38.2 
1996 4.92  6.55 6.82  1.63 1.9 33.24  38.7 
1997 4.75  6.48 6.73  1.73 2.0 36.40  41.7 
1998 4.31  5.49 5.83  1.17 1.5 27.17  35.2 
1999 4.62  6.00 6.46  1.39 1.8 29.99  39.8 
2000 4.97  6.25 7.14  1.28 2.2 25.85  43.8 
2001 4.28  5.23 6.00  0.95 1.7 22.22  40.2 
2002 4.05  4.91 5.57  0.86 1.5 21.24  37.3 
2003 3.69  4.24 4.75  0.55 1.1 14.92  28.6 
2004 3.66  4.45 4.91  0.78 1.2 21.32  34.0 
2005 3.72  4.40 4.90  0.68 1.2 18.13  31.7 
2006 3.93  4.88 5.51  0.96 1.6 24.34  40.4 
2007 3.89  4.76 5.48  0.86 1.59 22.20  29.0 
2008 (Jan-
Sep) 3.74  4.14  5.33  0.40  1.59  10.69 29.8 
Average 4.51  5.74  6.22  1.23  1.71  26.30  36.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Bloomberg 
 
Table 2: Yield Spread (Basis Points) on AMT Bonds and 
Fully Tax Exempt Bonds, 2003 
Maturity 
  1 Year  10 Year  30 Year  
Fully-Tax-Exempt Bonds: 
Treasury vs Municipal AAA  11.62  14.63  5.84 
Corporate AAA vs Municipal AAA  32.54  28.06  21.58 
Corporate AA vs Municipal AA+/AA-  44.36  30.56  25.71 
Corporate A vs Municipal A+/A-  37.17  28.46  25.56 
Bonds with Interest Subject to AMT: 
Treasury vs AMT AAA  -10.01  4.70  -1.35 
Corporate AAA vs AMT AAA  6.85  16.96  13.32 
Corporate AA vs AMT AA-  19.19  21.17  19.12 
Corporate A vs AMT A+/A-  17.90  22.38  20.37 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from Bloomberg.   30
 
Table 3: Ownership of Tax-Exempt and Taxable Bonds, 2004 
  Tax-exempt bonds  Taxable bonds 
   $ Billions  Percentage $ Billions  Percentage 
Household sector   743  37  1,351  11 
Money market mutual funds   314  15  359  3 
Mutual funds   294  14  772  6 
Property-casualty insurance companies   268  13  317  3 
Commercial banking   141  7  671  5 
Closed-end funds   89  4  74  1 
Government-sponsored enterprises   45  2  428  3 
Brokers and dealers   32  2  208  2 
Nonfinancial corporate business   32  2  33  0 
Rest of the world   26  1  3,875  32 
Life insurance companies   30  1  1,847  15 
Private pension funds  0  0  377  3 
State and local govt. retirement funds   2  0  365  3 
State and local governments   5  0  507  4 
Monetary authority  0  0  718  6 
Other 11  0  341  0 
Total assets   2,031  100  12,241  100 
Notes:  Data are drawn from the Flow of Funds, Tables L.209, L.211 and L.212.  The outstanding value of tax-exempt 
bonds was $2.031 trillion, while the outstanding stock of taxable bonds was $12.241 trillion.  “Other” includes credit 
unions, ABS issuers, REITs, nonfarm noncorporate business, saving institutions, federal government retirement funds, 
exchange traded funds, and funding companies). 
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Table 4: Stock-Flow Inconsistency in Tax-Exempt Bond Holdings and Tax-Exempt 
Interest, 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances  
   Households  Observations  Financial Assets 
    Millions  Percentage Thousands Percentage  Trillions  Percentage
Neither bonds nor interest  106.7  95.2%  19.1  84.6%  10.0  57.6% 
Bonds and interest  2.1  1.8  2.1  9.3  4.8  27.3 
No bonds but interest  1.2  1.1  0.7  3.3  1.5  8.6 
Bonds but no interest  2.1  1.8  0.6  2.8  1.1  6.5 
Total  112.1  100.0 22.6 100.0  17.4  100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2004 SCF. 
 
 
Table 5: Distribution of Implied Interest Rates on Tax-Exempt Bond 
Holdings in 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (Percentage Points) 
 Weighting  Variable 
   Households  Observations Financial Assets  Tax-exempt bond holdings 
Minimum 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
10th percentile  1.8  1.6  1.7  1.5 
25
th percentile   3.2  2.7  2.5  2.0 
Median 4.9  4.7 4.5  3.7 
75
th percentile   12.7  9.0  8.4  5.4 
90th percentile  45.5  23.4  20.0  8.4 
Maximum 320,000.0  320,000.0  320,000.0  320,000.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2004 SCF. 
 
 
Table 6: Tax-exempt Bonds and Tax-exempt Interest by TAXSIM 
Estimate of Federal Marginal Tax Rate  
  Tax-exempt bond holdings  Tax-exempt interest 
Federal MTR:  $ Billions  Percentage  $ Billions  Percentage
<0%  1.0 0.1% 0.0 0.0% 
0% 95.3  9.0  5.0  8.8 
0-10% 21.2  2.0  0.9  1.6 
10-15% 89.7  8.5  6.0  10.5 
15-25% 153.0  14.4  8.0  13.9 
25-30% 133.0  12.5  9.4  16.3 
30%+ 562.0  53.0  28.1  48.9 
Total  1,060.0  100.0 57.5 100.0 
Source: Authors' calculations using the 2004 SCF.    
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Table 7: Portfolio Holdings of Tax-exempt Bonds: Probit and Tobit Estimates Instrumenting for Last-Dollar MTRs  
  Probit Models  Tobit Models 










  2004 1998 1998 1998 2004 1998 1998 1998 
Parameter  Coeff.  SE  Coeff.   SE   Coeff.   SE  Coeff SE  Coeff  SE Coeff SE  Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Constant -3.4168  0.8525  -6.9355  0.5758 -7.2275 1.1565 -6.9712 0.5924 0.3371  0.0133 0.3475 0.0131 0.2217  0.5305 0.3479 0.0132
MTR -0.6716  0.6861  0.4697  0.5614 9.9768  38.408 0.4711 0.5611 -0.3403  0.2236 0.1139 0.1635 2.6404  10.566 0.1141 0.1634
Income (excluding capital income)   
15-25 -0.0937  0.2203  -0.1181  0.1691 -1.3187 5.1073 -0.1181 0.1691 -0.0337 0.0689 -0.0348 0.0532 -0.3609 1.4345 -0.0348 0.0532
25-50 0.1838  0.1960  -0.1546  0.1541 -1.7012 6.1512 -0.1547 0.1541 0.0419 0.0610 -0.0236 0.0488 -0.4409 1.7173 -0.0236 0.0488
50-75 0.2200  0.2223  0.1043  0.1870 -1.9022 7.8898 0.1040 0.1869 0.0710  0.0689 0.0543 0.0576 -0.4896 2.2014 0.0542 0.0576
75-100 0.1875  0.2516  0.0990  0.2054 -2.1888 9.0554 0.0986 0.2052 0.0606  0.0785 0.0529 0.0653 -0.5639 2.5148 0.0528 0.0653
100-250 0.4493  0.2448  0.2311  0.2062 -2.4309 10.543 0.2306 0.2060 0.1566  0.0778 0.1044 0.0622 -0.6102 2.9171 0.1043 0.0622
250+ 0.9662  0.2732  0.6630  0.2276 -2.5363 12.715 0.6624 0.2275 0.3258  0.0870 0.2538 0.0676 -0.6025 3.5121 0.2536 0.0675
Net worth        
50-100 0.3328  0.3224  0.4759  0.2028 0.4138  0.3907 0.4758 0.2028 0.1353  0.1066 0.2032 0.0666 0.1819  0.1396 0.2032 0.0666
100-250 0.5429  0.2028  0.8319  0.1627 0.7117  0.5408 0.8317 0.1627 0.1845  0.0669 0.3142 0.0577 0.2798  0.1827 0.3142 0.0577
250-1000 0.9577  0.1731  0.8831  0.1601 0.6409  1.1188 0.8829 0.1601 0.3165  0.0564 0.3342 0.0536 0.2663  0.3386 0.3341 0.0536
1000+ 1.3037  0.1493  1.2113  0.1257 0.9044  1.3451 1.2112 0.1257 0.4470  0.0496 0.4298 0.0430 0.3454  0.4089 0.4297 0.0431
Education        
High Schl  0.0834  0.1996  0.0679  0.1594 -0.1523 1.0257 0.0680 0.1594 0.0323  0.0621 -0.0044 0.0501 -0.0597 0.2642 -0.0043 0.0501
Some Col  0.4157  0.1930  0.2683  0.1635 0.0904  0.8571 0.2685 0.1635 0.1429  0.0604 0.0712 0.0523 0.0329  0.1971 0.0713 0.0523
Col Deg  0.5387  0.1893  0.2880  0.1523 -0.0704 1.6320 0.2881 0.1523 0.1525  0.0602 0.0647 0.0476 -0.0198 0.4019 0.0647 0.0476
Post Col  0.6611  0.1904  0.5003  0.1592 0.1306  1.6740 0.5004 0.1592 0.1967  0.0596 0.1116 0.0503 0.0260  0.4097 0.1116 0.0503
        
Age 25-34  -0.7419  0.4449  4.7362  0.4453 4.7507  0.5829 4.7722 0.4421 -0.1910 0.1545 -0.0828 0.0493 -0.0428 0.2029 -0.0828 0.0493
35-44 -0.2918  0.3484  4.5585  0.4412 4.4790  0.9438 4.5946 0.4382 -0.0554 0.1167 -0.1615 0.0378 -0.1423 0.0944 -0.1615 0.0378
45-54 -0.1134  0.3439  4.5566  0.4368 4.4576  1.0039 4.5926 0.4350 -0.0139 0.1157 -0.1507 0.0329 -0.1344 0.0915 -0.1508 0.0329
55-64 0.0531  0.3459  4.6240  0.4361 4.4903  1.1242 4.6601 0.4344 0.0552  0.1166 -0.1325 0.0328 -0.1204 0.0779 -0.1325 0.0328
65+* 0.2187  0.3475  5.1264  0.4375 4.8736  1.6262 5.1624 0.4353 na  na na na  na na na na 
Risk averse  -0.1527  0.0989  -0.2503  0.0993 -0.1015 0.6974 -0.2504 0.0993 -0.0216 0.0312 -0.0333 0.0334 -0.0005 0.1660 -0.0333 0.0334
Female 0.0251  0.1391  0.1611  0.1180 0.2635  0.5204 0.1610 0.1180 0.0058  0.0445 0.0438 0.0376 0.0722  0.1445 0.0437 0.0377
Married 0.0098  0.1082  -0.0367  0.1048 0.1405  0.6867 -0.0367 0.1048 -0.0111 0.0341 -0.0061 0.0323 0.0346 0.1560 -0.0061 0.0323
HH size  0.0366  0.0314  -0.0561  0.0317 0.0253  0.3699 -0.0561 0.0317 0.0101  0.0102 -0.0232 0.0102 0.0001  0.1115 -0.0232 0.0102
Observations  4,519   4,305   4,305   4,305   4,519   4,305   4,305  4,305  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All equations include industry and occupation indicator variables (except as noted), and weight all SCF observations 
equally. STATA was not able to achieve convergence with and indicator for 65+.   33
 
 
Table 8: Portfolio Composition of Households with and without Tax-Exempt Bonds 
  Households without tax-exempt bonds 
Households with tax-exempt 
bonds 
Directly held equity  25%  29% 
Equity in mutual funds  10  15 
Tax deferred equity  8  5 
Tax deferred bonds  15  8 
Tax-exempt bonds  0  18 
Taxable bonds  4  6 
Interest bearing accounts  24  9 
Other financial assets  14  10 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2004 SCF. 
 
 
Table 9: Household Portfolio Holdings of Equity, Taxable Bonds, and Tax-Exempt 
Bonds, Including Mutual Fund Holdings  


















No holdings of equity, taxable bonds, or tax-
exempt bonds (including mutual funds)  69.16 62%  11%  2.06  12%  19% 
Specialized in taxable bonds  10.30  9  17  0.62  4  20 
Specialized in equity  18.59  17  19  5.41  31  22 
Specialized in tax-exempt bonds  0.24  0  14  0.10  1  10 
Mixed (taxable bonds & equity)  9.91  9  21  3.43  20  23 
Mixed (equity & tax-exempt bonds)  1.46  1  21  1.67  10  24 
Mixed (taxable & tax-exempt bonds)  0.13  0  12  0.05  0  21 
Holdings of all three asset classes  2.31  2  24  4.07  23  25 
Total 112.11  100  14  17.42  100  23 
Source: Author's calculation using 2004 SCF. 
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Table 10: Structure of Household Portfolios, After Repealing Tax Exemption, Assuming 
Various Portfolio Substitutions  
  Assumption About Portfolio Substitution 
   Original 
Taxable Bonds 
Replace Tax-
Exempt Bonds  Proportional 
Equity Replaces 
Tax-Exempt 
Bonds  Tax efficient 
  Share of Aggregate Household Portfolio  
Directly held equity  0.290  0.290  0.373  0.469  0.424 
Equity in mutual funds  0.149  0.149  0.175  0.150  0.149 
Tax deferred equity  0.045  0.045  0.046  0.045  0.045 
Tax deferred bonds  0.085  0.085  0.087  0.085  0.085 
Tax-exempt  bonds  0.180  0 0 0  0 
Taxable  bonds  0.060  0.239 0.078 0.060  0.105 
Interest bearing accounts  0.088  0.088  0.114  0.088  0.088 
Other financial assets  0.104  0.104  0.126  0.104  0.104 
  Average Portfolio Share (Households Weighted Equally) 
Directly held equity  0.167  0.167  0.193  0.316  0.258 
Equity in mutual funds  0.202  0.202  0.237  0.202  0.202 
Tax deferred equity  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.062 
Tax deferred bonds  0.117  0.117  0.117  0.117  0.117 
Tax-exempt  bonds  0.149  0 0 0  0 
Taxable  bonds  0.043  0.192 0.051 0.043  0.102 
Interest bearing accounts  0.151  0.151  0.191  0.151  0.151 
Other financial assets  0.109  0.109  0.122  0.109  0.109 
Source: Author's calculation using 2004 SCF, Internet TAXSIM and Kevin B. Moore's Code. 
In Column 2, investors substitute taxable bonds for tax-exempt bonds.  In Column 3, investors replace tax-exempt bonds with all other assets in  
proportion to the initial holdings of those other assets in their taxable portfolios.  In Column 4, taxable equity replaces tax-exempt bonds.  In 
Column 5, tax exempt bonds are replaced with equity or taxable bonds depending on each investor’s first-dollar  marginal tax rate on capital 
income.   35
 
Table 11: Revenue Cost and Distributional Effects of Eliminating Tax Exemption 
Under Different Portfolio Substitution Assumptions 
Percentage of Tax Increase Allocated to Households 
in Different Income Groups 
 Portfolio Substitution Assumption 
Estimated 
Revenue 
Effect ($B)  0-40 K  40-75 K 75-125 K  125-250 K  250+
Taxable bonds  14.20  0.4  2.8  3.4  11.5  81.7 
Proportional 7.91  0.4  3.8  2.2  12.6  81.0 
Equity 10.10  0.4  2.9  3.3  12.5  80.5 
Tax efficient  10.90  0.4  3.1  3.3  12.6  80.3 
Source: Authors' calculations using 2004 SCF, Internet TAXSIM and Kevin B. Moore's Code.  See Table 11 for further details.  . 
Taxable bonds: substitute tax-exempt bonds with taxable bonds in investor's portfolio. Proportional: substitute tax-exempt bonds with a 
portfolio of assets (excluding tax deferred accounts) that is proportional to each investor's original portfolio. Equity: substitute tax-
exempt bonds with direclty held equity. Tax efficient: substitute tax exempt bonds with equity or taxable bonds depending on each 
investor marginal tax rate on the first dollar of capital income.  Households with income between 125-250K paid 22.9% of federal 
income tax liabilities in 2003, and those in the 250K+ category paid 42.9%  income taxes. 
 
 
Table 12: Increase in Federal Income Tax Liabilities From Repeal of Tax 
Exemption, Stratifying Households by Household Income  
Income level  Portfolio Substitution 
Assumption  0-40 K 40-75 K  75-125 K  125-250 K  250+  Total 
  Mean for All Households 
Taxable bonds  1  13  25  178  4,176  127 
Proportional 1  10  9  108  2,300  71 
Equity 1  9  17  137  2,919  90 
Tax efficient  1  11  19  148  3,141  97 
  Mean for All Households with Tax-Exempt Bond Holdings  
Taxable bonds  144  366  536  1,798  14,146  3,434 
Proportional 81  274  203  1,089  7,791  1,912 
Equity 105  264  366  1,386  9,887  2,429 
Tax efficient  127  309  396  1,499  10,639  2,624 
  Median for All Households with Tax-Exempt Bond Holdings  
Taxable bonds  27  108  225  315  3,147  243 
Proportional 8  38  54  179  1,288  81 
Equity 18  68  182  235  2,164  189 
Tax efficient  27  108  182  235  2,164  225 
Source: Authors' calculations using 2004 SCF, Internet TAXSIM and Kevin B. Moore's Code.  See Table 11 for details 
of substitution assumptions.   Taxable bonds: substitute tax-exempt bonds with taxable bonds in investor's portfolio. 
Proportional: substitute tax-exempt bonds with a portfolio of assets (excluding tax deferred accounts) that is 
proportional to each investor's original portfolio. Equity: substitute tax-exempt bonds with directly held equity. Tax 
efficient: substitute tax exempt bonds with equity or taxable bonds depending on each investor marginal tax rate on the 
first dollar of capital income.  
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Table 13: Distribution of Ratio of Tax-Exempt Interest to AGI  
Holdings of Tax Exempt 
Bonds 
  $ Billions  Share of total 
 Household-weighted Marginal 
Tax Rate on Interest Income for 
Households with this Ratio 
0% 107  10.2%  14.5% 
0 - 10%  313  29.7  25.3 
10 - 30%  241  22.8  24.3 
30 - 50%  127  12.0  16.9 
50 - 100%  124  11.7  12.0 
100% +  144  13.6  12.2 
Total 1,056  100.0  14.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2004 SCF. 
 
Table 14: Distribution of Amount of Tax-Exempt Interest Received  
Holdings of Tax Exempt 
bonds 
   $ Billions  Share of total 
 Household-weighted Marginal 
Tax Rate on Interest Income 
$0 100  9.5%  14.5 
0 - 10K  130  12.3  23.5 
10 - 50K  160  15.1  24.8 
50 - 100K  251  23.7  26.5 
100 - 250K  135  12.8  28.7 
250 - 500K  121  11.5  31.8 
500K - 1M  101  9.6  22.3 
1M +  58  5.5  29.9 
Total 1,056  100.00  14.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2004 SCF. 
 
Table 15: Revenue Effects ($ billion) of Limiting Tax 
Exemption  
Substitution Assumption:     
  Limit to 10% of AGI  Limit to 10K 
Taxable Bond Substitution  5.45  9.79 
Equity Substitution  3.84  6.87 
  Limit to 20% of AGI  Limit to 50K 
Taxable Bond Substitution  2.38  6.21 
Equity Substitution  1.66  4.30 
  Limit to 30% of AGI  Limit to 100K 
Taxable Bond Substitution  1.36  3.92 
Equity Substitution  0.91  2.66 
Source: Authors’ calculations using 2004 SCF, Internet TAXSIM and 
Moore’s Code.  See Table 11 for further details and explanation of 
substitution assumptions. 
 